Guides · Privacy fundamentals
Anonymity methods
Each method breaks some of the links an analyst relies on and leaves others intact. The cards say which.
Fourteen methods, described rather than ranked. Source links checked on .
01What it hides
An address, an input-output link, a payment route or an amount. No method hides all of them.
02Who you trust
Your own keys, a contract, a coordinator, or an operator holding your coins. The more they hold, the more their logs matter.
03What leaks
Change outputs, amounts, timing, IP addresses and KYC records at exchanges. Most deanonymization happens here, outside the cryptography.
One transaction, many owners- 1ParticipantsWallets A, B and C
- 2CoordinationCoordinator or makers
- 3SigningOwn inputs only
- 4OutputsEqual amounts
Simplified sketch.
What an analyst seesMany inputs and equal-value outputs. Obviously a CoinJoin, but not which output is yours.
Hides
Which input paid which output.
Doesn’t hide
That you mixed. Merging outputs or change afterwards relinks them.
Technical detail
- Mechanism
- Each wallet signs only its own inputs. Anonymous credentials keep the WabiSabi coordinator blind to links.
- Who you trust
- Nobody holds coins. Coordinators see IPs without Tor. A JoinMarket taker sees every maker’s coins.
- Known leaks
- Change outputs, often matched by subset-sum. Then address reuse and timing.
Sources: WabiSabi specification · JoinMarket client (archived April 2026)
Explore coordinators →
Both sides add inputs- 1Sender’s inputsPayer drafts the payment
- 2Receiver’s inputPayee adds a coin
Simplified sketch.
What an analyst seesAn ordinary payment. Assume one owner and you misread both the amount and the change.
Hides
Who owned which input, and the real amount.
Doesn’t hide
Anything from your counterparty. Each sees the other’s inputs.
Technical detail
- Mechanism
- BIP 78 needs a receiver endpoint. BIP 77 (draft) runs asynchronously through a relay directory.
- Who you trust
- Nobody holds funds. Both wallets need support.
- Known leaks
- Mismatched script types or wallet fingerprints between inputs.
Sources: BIP 78: Payjoin · BIP 77: Async Payjoin (draft)
Explore privacy tools →
Many BCH wallets, one transaction- 1ParticipantsSeparate BCH wallets
- 2CoordinationServer holds no keys
- 3FusionMany uneven amounts
Simplified sketch.
What an analyst seesA large transaction with many uneven outputs. Easy to spot, hard to untangle.
Hides
Which inputs funded which outputs.
Doesn’t hide
Coins before and after. BCH is a transparent chain.
Technical detail
- Mechanism
- Components arrive over separate Tor connections, so the server can’t group them. CashShuffle, the older design, is deprecated.
- Who you trust
- The server can stall a round. It can’t take funds.
- Known leaks
- Spending fused outputs together. Anonymity depends on how many wallets fuse at once.
Source: CashFusion protocol FAQ
02 · Payment-layer privacy
Receiving & payments
These change how a payment is addressed or routed. They do nothing for the history of the coins you spend.
Onion-routed through channels- 1SenderBuilds the onion
- 2Routing nodesOne hop each
- 3RecipientReleases the preimage
Simplified sketch.
What an analyst seesOn-chain, only channel opens and closes. A routing node sees an amount, a hash and its neighbours.
Hides
Payments from the chain, and the full route from any one hop.
Doesn’t hide
Channel opens and closes. Invoices reveal your node ID unless you use blinded paths.
Technical detail
- Mechanism
- Onion routing (BOLT 4) over funded 2-of-2 channels. Hash time-locks settle all hops or none.
- Who you trust
- With your own node, nobody. Custodial wallets see every payment; a sole LSP peer sees amounts and timing.
- Known leaks
- One payment hash across all hops lets colluding nodes on a route link it.
Source: BOLT 4: Onion routing
Explore privacy tools →
One static address, a new output each time- 1Static addressPublished once
- 2Fresh outputsFound by scanning
Simplified sketch.
What an analyst seesOrdinary taproot outputs, unlinked to the published address or to each other.
Doesn’t hide
Amounts. Spend two outputs together and the common-input heuristic links them.
Technical detail
- Mechanism
- BIP 352: each output key comes from ECDH between the sender’s inputs and the receiver’s scan key.
- Who you trust
- No one. A light wallet’s scanning server may learn which outputs are yours.
- Known leaks
- Sender inputs and amounts stay public.
Source: BIP 352: Silent Payments
Explore privacy tools →
03 · Cryptographic privacy
Protocol-level privacy
Privacy built into the transaction format or a contract. It’s strong inside. Users get linked at the entry and exit points.
Three protections in every transaction- 1One-time addressesReceiver hidden
- 2RingCTAmount hidden
- 3Ring signaturesReal input hidden
Three protections, applied together.
What an analyst seesRing members, hidden amounts, one-time outputs. Sender, receiver and amount aren’t readable.
Hides
Sender, receiver and amount, on-chain.
Doesn’t hide
Off-chain records. A KYC exchange at both ends of a transfer can link it.
Technical detail
- Mechanism
- All three are mandatory. Dandelion++ obscures which node broadcast first.
- Who you trust
- Your wallet. Remote nodes see your IP; light-wallet servers holding your view key see incoming payments.
- Known leaks
- Decoys that don’t match real spending patterns, and timing.
Source: Monero protocol overview
Explore privacy tools →
Withdraw by proof, not by link- 1DepositPublic
- 2Association setASP approves deposits
- 3ProofZero-knowledge
- 4WithdrawalTo a fresh address
Simplified sketch.
What an analyst seesA public deposit, later a withdrawal with a valid proof. Only amounts and timing tie them.
Hides
Which approved deposit funded a withdrawal.
Doesn’t hide
Amounts and timing. Deposit 1.337 ETH, withdraw 1.337 ETH an hour later, and you’re linked.
Technical detail
- Mechanism
- Zero-knowledge proofs of membership in the pool and the ASP’s set. Partial withdrawals are allowed.
- Who you trust
- The ASP picks whose deposits count; rejected ones exit by public ragequit. The entry contract is upgradeable.
- Known leaks
- Your anonymity set is approved deposits of that asset, not the whole pool.
Source: Privacy Pools documentation
Private inside, public at the edges- 1ShieldPublic tokens in
- 2Private transferNo visible owner
- 3UnshieldBack to a public address
Simplified sketch.
What an analyst seesPublic shields and unshields. In between, encrypted notes with no visible owner.
Hides
Balances and transfers inside the pool.
Doesn’t hide
Edge amounts. Shield 10,000 USDC, unshield nearly that the next day, and analysts pair them.
Technical detail
- Mechanism
- Contracts hold encrypted notes and zk-SNARKs prove each spend. Broadcasters pay gas for you.
- Who you trust
- The contracts and circuits. Wallets using Private Proofs of Innocence hold new shields for an hour.
- Known leaks
- Unshielding to an address you’ve used before.
Sources: RAILGUN privacy overview · Unshielding
04 · Intermediation & exchange
Services & exchanges
Someone else moves your coins. You trade on-chain links for trust in their records.
The operator holds both ends- 1DepositCoins to the operator
- 2Operator’s poolOperator holds the coins
- 3PayoutDifferent coins, later
Simplified sketch.
What an analyst seesA deposit to a labelled mixer cluster, payouts from other coins. Fixed delays let them match.
Hides
The deposit-to-payout path, from outsiders.
Doesn’t hide
Anything from the operator. A custodial mixer’s privacy is exactly as good as its logs.
Technical detail
- Mechanism
- The operator pays you from unrelated coins, minus a fee.
- Who you trust
- The operator, fully. Logs get seized: investigators took 7 TB of ChipMixer data in 2023.
- Known leaks
- Amount and timing. Exchanges flag payouts from known mixer clusters.
Research: Mixcoin: Anonymity for Bitcoin with accountable mixes (2014)
Explore mixers →
Two chains, one hash- 1Lock on chain ARefund after timeout
- 2Lock on chain BSame hash
- 3Claim on chain BPreimage goes public
- 4Claim on chain ABob reuses it
Simplified sketch.
What an analyst seesTwo HTLCs on two chains, same hash, claimed minutes apart. Trivially paired.
Hides
No transaction data. It removes the custodian and its KYC.
Doesn’t hide
The link between legs: hash, amounts and timing.
Technical detail
- Mechanism
- Hash time-locks on both chains. Both sides claim or both refund.
- Who you trust
- No custodian. Stay online to claim or refund in time.
- Known leaks
- Hash reuse. Adaptor-signature swaps (BTC–XMR) avoid it; the Bitcoin 2-of-2 is still visible.
Source: Decred atomic swap reference
Explore swap listings →
A provider in the middle- 1DepositTo the provider
- 2PayoutFrom its hot wallet
Simplified sketch.
What an analyst seesA deposit to a labelled exchange, a similar payout minutes later. Easy match.
Hides
Little. The payout uses the provider’s coins.
Doesn’t hide
Anything from the provider. Flagged deposits can be held until you pass KYC.
Technical detail
- Mechanism
- Deposit one asset, receive another, often via a partner. Aggregators front several providers.
- Who you trust
- The provider holds your coins. KYC risk sits with whoever executes, often unnamed.
- Known leaks
- Amount and timing. Deposits are screened by chain-analytics vendors.
Example provider terms: Exolix terms
Explore swap listings →
Vaults signed by a node set- 1InboundMemo names the destination
- 2ObservationNodes watch the chain
- 3Vault signingThreshold signature
- 4OutboundMemo cites the inbound tx
Simplified sketch.
What an analyst seesYour destination address in the inbound memo, the inbound hash in the outbound one. Explorers show both ends.
Hides
Nothing about the swap itself. There’s just no exchange collecting KYC.
Doesn’t hide
The input-output link, written into both memos.
Technical detail
- Mechanism
- Pools pair each asset with RUNE. Bonded nodes threshold-sign vault payouts.
- Who you trust
- The node set. Chain halts have paused swaps before.
- Known leaks
- Memos, amounts and timing on two transparent chains.
Source: THORChain vault architecture
Explore swap listings →
You state the result; a solver delivers- 1IntentSigned request
- 2QuotesSolvers compete
- 3ExecutionSolver fills it
- 4SettlementVerifier contract
Simplified sketch.
What an analyst seesA bridge deposit, a settlement on NEAR, a payout elsewhere. All public.
Hides
No more than a swap. It’s an execution model.
Doesn’t hide
Your request from the relay and solvers, or either end from chain watchers.
Technical detail
- Mechanism
- Solvers fill signed intents and a verifier contract settles them. Bridges move assets in and out.
- Who you trust
- Relay, solvers, bridges and front end. Any can log addresses, and KYC depends on the front end.
- Known leaks
- Bridge addresses and cross-chain amount matching.
Source: NEAR Intents documentation
Explore swap listings →
Cash off the books, bitcoin on-chain- 1CashHanded over in person
- 2BitcoinPublic transaction
Simplified sketch.
What an analyst seesAn ordinary transaction, or a recognisable Bisq 2-of-2 deposit. No bank record.
Hides
The fiat side, from banks.
Doesn’t hide
You, from your counterparty: your face and receiving address.
Technical detail
- Mechanism
- Cash for bitcoin, directly or with platform escrow.
- Who you trust
- Your counterparty. Cash disputes are hard to prove.
- Known leaks
- Platform chat logs, and receiving addresses you’ve reused.
Source: Bisq face-to-face trading rules
Explore P2P markets →
Quick comparisonOptional · all 14 methods
One line per method. The cards above have the conditions.
The same 14 methods. Custody and privacy are separate columns.
| Method |
Custodial? |
Typical KYC |
Breaks |
Main leak |
On this site |
| Custodial mixer / tumbler |
Yes |
None claimed |
Deposit-to-payout link, for outsiders |
Operator logs |
Mixers |
| CoinJoin / WabiSabi / JoinMarket |
No (coordinator sees metadata) |
None |
Input-output link in one transaction |
Change, consolidation, timing |
Coordinators, Privacy tools |
| PayJoin (p2ep) |
No |
None |
Common-input heuristic; apparent amount |
Needs receiver support |
Privacy tools |
| Atomic swap (on-chain HTLC) |
No |
None |
Nothing; removes the custodian |
Same hash on both chains |
Swaps · Never KYC |
| Instant swap / aggregator |
Yes, during the swap |
Varies; AML holds can trigger it |
Direct on-chain path only |
Provider sees both ends |
Swaps |
| THORChain (cross-chain AMM) |
No; node-signed vaults |
None at protocol |
Nothing; removes the custodian |
Memos link input and output |
Swaps · Never KYC |
| Intent-based cross-chain (e.g. NEAR Intents) |
Solvers and bridges |
Depends on the front end |
Nothing; changes who executes |
Relay, solvers and bridges see it |
Swaps · Never KYC |
| Lightning Network |
Not with your own node |
None |
Payments off-chain; route per hop |
Channel opens and closes; one hash per route |
Privacy tools |
| Silent Payments / stealth addresses |
No |
None |
Address reuse |
Amounts visible; scanning cost |
Privacy tools |
| Monero (native) |
No |
None |
Sender, receiver and amount on-chain |
KYC when you buy or sell |
Swaps · Never KYC |
| CashFusion / CashShuffle (BCH) |
No |
None |
Input-output link in one fusion |
Consolidation; BCH only |
— |
| Privacy Pools (association sets) |
No; Ethereum contracts |
None at protocol; ASP approval |
Deposit-withdrawal link, among approved deposits |
ASP gatekeeping; amounts and timing |
— |
| RAILGUN (0zk shielded notes) |
No; contracts and zk proofs |
None at protocol; PPOI in wallets |
Balances and transfers inside the pool |
Shield and unshield amounts |
— |
| P2P bitcoin-for-cash |
Escrow or none |
Varies by platform |
Bank record of the fiat side |
Counterparty knows you |
P2P markets |
